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Abstract. A higher level of transparency in decision making increases the probability that
corruption or wrongdoing is detected. It may also improve outsiders’ information about the
identities of key decision makers, thereby enhance incentives to establish “connections” for
corruption. The connections effect may dominate the detection effect for local improvement
in transparency and generate an increase in corruption, a prediction sharply in contrast with
standard theories of transparency.
1. Introduction
Having a good “connection” with key decision makers is often considered a
valuable asset because it can be used to facilitate exchange of bribes and gifts
for favors and services. A connection with a high-ranked public official may
be abused, depending on the context, to “buy” a job, to smuggle goods or
destroy criminal evidence. In organizations, one may influence decisions on
promotion or pay raise by building a connection with an upper-layer member.
Building a connection for corruption is a costly investment that establishes
mutual trust, thereby reducing or eliminating the enforcement costs of corrupt
transactions.1
Besides the network of connections, another potentially important determ-
inant of corruption in an organization istransparency. When the decision
making process is completely impenetrable, corrupt behavior can hardly be
detected. At the other extreme, under full transparency decisions can easily
be verified and there is no secrecy concerning the rules and the identities of
decision makers. Connections cannot be abused in a fully transparent organ-
ization. Legal and corruption experts and organization theorists associate a
higher degree of transparency with lower corruption of all kinds.2
Theoretical models that study the control of corruption have by and large
neglected individual incentives to build and use connections for corruption.
∗ I would like to thank Parimal Kanti Bag and a referee for very useful comments.
Remaining errors are mine.
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In these models, connections are implicitly assumed to be given or costless
to establish and the degree of transparency of a decision making system is
captured by the probability that corrupt or wrong decisions are detected.
The vast informal public administration literature on transparency focuses
on how transparency can be achieved and factors that limit transparency
be surmounted.3 This paper presents a model with explicit links between
transparency, incentives to build connections and the use of connections for
corruption. It shows that more transparency does not necessarily imply less
corruption. Corruption may increase or become more likely at least for local
improvements in transparency, if one takes into account the potential impact
of transparency on outsiders’ information about the identities of key decision
makers, and therefore on the incentives to build connections. That is, though
corruption is more likely to be detected in a more transparent organization, as
an inevitable side effect potential corruptors receive better information about
with whom they should connect. If this “connections effect” is important and
dominates the effect on the detection probability, corruption may actually
increase when the organization becomes (locally) more transparent. How-
ever, in a most representative range of parameter values, for sufficiently large
improvements in transparency the detection effect dominates the connections
effect; then more transparency reduces corruption.
It is worth recalling that connection building is a costly investment that
consumes time and resources. Like all investments, connections depreciate
over time. The connections effect of improved transparency should be oper-
ating slowly (though at a speed that depends on the context), leaving potential
corruptors with their fixed established connections in the short run. With fixed
connections, thus absent the connections effect, more transparency always
implies less corruption. But as the result mentioned above suggests, corrup-
tion may well increase when connection-building becomes a choice variable,
in the long run.
The next section develops a simple model and shows the possibility of a
local positive correlation between transparency and corruption. In Section 3 I
present a brief discussion of the result and extensions of the model.
2. The model and the result
Consider a public office with two agents, A and B, who are delegated the task
of providing various services to the public. A client, representing the public,
is interested in obtaining an illegal service from which he derives a benefit
worth z dollars. This benefit may be a job in the public sector for which the
client is unqualified, a construction permit in a forbidden zone and the like.
Thus, if the client ever applies, he should be denied the service. The office has
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a rule or assignment mechanism, unknown to the client, which determines the
agent who will handle the application, A or B. Denote this agent by r.
The agents are corruptible, that is, the agent r may deliver the service for
a bribe of b dollars. To capture the idea that connections facilitate corruption,
I assume that the client can use bribery to influence the decision of agent
r only if he has an established connection with r. The client’s number of
established connections (two, one or zero) is therefore an important determ-
inant of expected corruption in the office. If the client has zero connections,
bribery is impossible. With two connections, the client can bribe agent r with
probability one. With only one connection, say A, the client may have the
wrong connection ex-post, if the assignment mechanism determines agent B
as agent r. In this case the client will not be able to bribe r.4 Establishing
connections is not illegal per se, but the abuse of connections for corrupt
benefits is.
This set-up can be applied to various contexts of decision making. Con-
sider for instance an upper layer of a hierarchical organization with members
A and B, and let the client be a lower-rank employee whose promotion de-
cision is to be considered by either A or B. Suppose that the client does not
qualify for promotion but that he can try to influence the decision if he has
an established connection with A, B or both, but not otherwise. The variable
z would denote the benefit from promotion and b would denote the bribe
(which may not be entirely monetary in kind) that the employee may have
to offer member r to secure the promotion. Another application of this set-up
would be government procurement contracts, where especially in several less
developed countries a firm’s likelihood of success depends so much on its
connections with high-ranked officials.
Corruption is detected and the two parties are penalized with probability
µ. This probability is linked to the concept of transparency below. The pen-
alties are FC for the client and Fr for the agent r= A,B, inclusive of all
the potential losses that the detected parties incur. These penalties and the
potential corrupt benefit z are exogenously given. To simplify the analysis I
assume that the parties consume their respective net corrupt benefits z− b
and b before any detection occurs. The analysis and the results go through
under the opposite assumption, when these benefits are made conditional on
that corruption goes undetected.
Transparency of the office is measured by the parameterα, a number
between zero and one. The extreme caseα = 1 corresponds to the most
“open” office while the other extremeα = 0 corresponds to the impenetrable
“black box” office. In this model the degree of transparency influences the
client’s corruption incentives through two channels. First, bribery is more
easily detected in a more transparent office. That is, the detection probability
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Figure 1. The sequence of events.
µ(α) is increasing inα. It is impossible to detect bribery in the black box
office (µ(0) = 0), while any bribery is detected in the fully transparent office
(µ(1) = 1). Any real world organization or office would lie in between these
two extremes. Second, information about the identities of decision makers is
relatively less noisy in more transparent offices. To represent this information
problem I let the client receive a signal j= A or j = B about the identity
of agent r at the very beginning, before deciding on his connections (see the
sequence of events in Figure 1). The signal j is true with probability p(j, α).
Prior to this signal the client is completely uninformed about r, that is, A and
B are equally likely to be r. The signal is informative: p(j, α) ≥ 1/2, which
holds with strict inequality ifα > 0.5 Thus, p(j, α) > 1/2 is the probability
that the client correctly identifies agent j as agent r, and it is increasing inα.
For the two extreme cases, I assume that the signal j from a black box office is
completely uninformative regarding the assignment rule, i.e., p(j,0) = 1/2,
while the fully transparent office is completely informative, i.e., p(j 1) = 1.
To summarize these assumptions formally:
Office α is more transparent than officeα′ if α > α′, and therefore (i)
µ(α) > µ(α′) and (ii) p(j, α) > p(j, α′) given the observed signal j∈ {A,B}.
The payoffs are determined as follows. Suppose that ex-post the client is
connected with the right agent, that is, agent r. If the client does not offer a
bribe, his payoff is zero. If he pays the bribe b, the client obtains the benefit
z but he may be detected with probabilityµ(α), so his expected payoff is
UC(α) = z−µ(α)FC−b. The agent’s expected payoff is Ur(α) = b−µ(α)Fr
if he accepts the bribe, zero otherwise. Corruption will occur if there exists
b > 0 such that UC(α) > 0 and Ur(α) > 0. I assume that the size of the
bribe is determined according to the Nash bargaining solution; that is, when
the total surplus from corruption z− µ(α)(FC + Fr) is positive, the bribe is
given by6
b∗(α) = µ(α)Fr + [z− µ(α)(FC+ Fr)]/2.
Using this expression, the client’s and the agent’s potential payoff from
corruption can be written as UC(α) = [z− µ(α)(FC+ Fr)]/2.
In determining his optimal number of connections, the client will weight
the potential payoff from each connection against the corresponding costs.
These costs, denotedγ per connection, consist of the time, effort, resources
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and possibly the gifts that the client allocates to the agent with whom he seeks
a connection. Suppose, to simplify the analysis, that the client unilaterally
bears the cost of establishing connections (this can easily be relaxed). Then
the client is said to have a connection with agent j if he incurs the correspond-
ing costγ . Connecting with both agents will double the cost, to 2γ , but it will
increase the probability that the client ex-post has the right connection to one.
Clearly, if UC(α) is nonpositive, the optimal number of connections is
zero. Thus the client will have an incentive to connect only if
µ(α) <
z
FC+ Fr . (1)
I will assume z< FC+ Fr, so that the expected total surplus from corrup-
tion is negative when detection is a sure event. Then, one can defineαε[0,1]
throughµ(α) = z/(FC+Fr). Sinceµ(α) is increasing inα, it follows that the
office with transparencyα ≥ α will display zero corruption. I focus below
on the analytically interesting caseα < α and study the client’s connection
incentives.
Note that UC(α) > 0 for α < α, UC(α) = 0 and UC(0) = z/2. If the
client has no connections, his payoff is UC = 0. If he connects with both A
and B, his expected payoff is
UABC (α) = z− µ(α)FC− b∗(α)− 2γ. (2)
Consider the case of one connection, with A or B. Clearly, the client
should connect with agent j as the signal suggests, because p(j, α) > 1/2
givenα > 0. Thus, he will connect with agent A if j= A, agent B if j= B,
and be indifferent between A and B only ifα = 0, which corresponds to the
case p(j,0) = 1/2 for j = A,B. By connecting only with j, the client expects
the payoff
UjC(α) = p(j, α)[z− µ(α)FC− b∗(α)] − γ. (3)
The client’s optimal decision at the connection stage can be derived from
(2) and (3) as follows: His optimal number of connections will be
two if UC(α) > 2γ,
one ifγ /p(jα) < UC(α) ≤ 2γ, (4)
zero if UC(α) ≤ γ /p(j, α)
where UC(α) = [z − µ(α)(Fr + FC)]/2. I investigate below the client’s
connection incentives as a function of the transparency of the office.
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From (4), it is clear that the office will display no corruption regardless
of the degree of transparency if the cost of establishing connections is high
relative to the potential corrupt benefit, that is, if UC(α) < γ . To rule out this
trivial case at least for a range ofα, suppose that z is sufficiently large relative




The expected payoff UABC (α) from having two connections is decreasing in
α. The range of transparency levels at which the client has two connections,
if it exists, must therefore lie at the left tail of the interval[0,1]. Such a
range exists if UABC (0) = z/2− 2γ > 0, that is, if z/2 > 2γ . On the other
hand, if z/2 ≤ 2γ , it is never optimal to have two connections. Then the
optimal number of connections is zero asα → 0, because UjC(α) < 0 and
UABC (α) < 0 asα → 0. For the case z/2 > 2γ , defineα̃1 through z= 4γ +
µ(α̃)(FC+Fr). The optimal number of connections is two forα ∈ [0, α̃1), less
than two forα ≥ α̃1. In fact, by (4) the optimal number of connections falls to
one atα = α̃1, since p(j, α̃1)(z− µ(α̃1)(FC + Fr)) > 2γ and p(j, α̃1) > 1/2.
For the caseγ < z/2≤ 2γ , setα̃1 = 0.
Now the interesting aspect of the analysis is that forα in the range [̃α1, α)
the expected payoff from having one connection is not monotonically de-
creasing inα. While UC(α) is decreasing, p(j, α) is increasing inα, so the
expected payoff UjC(α) = p(j, α)UC(α)−γ from having one connection may








is indeterminate forα ∈ [α̃1, α). UjC(α) may increase and become positive,
thus make it beneficial to establish a connection asα is increased in the range
[α̃1, α). The upper chart in Figure 2 shows this possibility for the case z/2<
2γ (thus, α̃1 = 0) where UC(α) becomes larger thanγ /p(j, α) at the right
neighborhood of a transparency levelα̃2, to decrease later and eventually be
equal toγ /p(j, α) at someα̃3 > α̃2. The client has one connection in the
intermediate range (α̃2, α̃3), zero connection elsewhere. Bribery occurs with
positive probability p(j, α), if the client has the right connection, that is, if
j = r. The potential bribe size is shown in the lower chart in Figure 2, as a
decreasing function ofα. Thus, increasing transparency fromα0 ∈ [0, α̃2] to
α1 ∈ (α̃2, α̃3) will actually increase connections and corruption.7
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Figure 2. Incentives to establish a connection (upper chart) and the potential bribe size when
the client has a connection with r (lower chart) as a function of transparencyα for the case
z/2< 2γ .
3. Discussion and extensions
This paper highlights two opposing effects of transparency on corruption.
Transparency deters corruption by making the decision making process more
open to the “public” but enhances the incentives to establish connections for
corruption by improving the information about the identities of the “key” de-
cision makers. For a substantial improvement in transparency (i.e., increasing
α aboveα) the detection effect dominates and eliminates connection-building
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incentives and corruption. Open-government or sunshine laws which mandate
that all meetings where decisions are made be open to the public have been
enacted in many states to meet this objective. However, not all decisions in
organizations, public or private, can be made open to the public or completely
transparent. Transparency may conflict with the requirements of confidential-
ity as in the example of personnel decisions. When transparency is bounded
and low, it is not obvious whether the quality of decisions can be improved
and corruption or favoritism eliminated through small-scale improvements in
transparency.
There are instances in which a lower level of transparency pays off as
lower corruption. In Turkey, the law stipulates that each September university
departments offer written tests in special fields to students dismissed during
the last two academic years. Faculty were receiving calls and visits from
students and their relatives during this period. The scope for corruption and
favoritism being high, some departments have decided to keep test evaluators’
identities secret, to the extent possible. The policy reduced transparency, but
it succeeded to reduce favoritism and corruption because its impact on the
students’ incentives to “connect” with the evaluators has more than offset
the increased risk that a wrongdoing goes undetected. Interpreted within the
present model, the policy of reducingα caused a large fall in p(j, α) while
leavingµ(α) almost unchanged. Thus, to evaluate the potential impact of
a change in transparencyα, policy makers should not neglect the “connec-
tions effect”. However, when the connections effect is negligible or relatively
small, the correlation between transparency and corruption will be negative
as conventional wisdom suggests.8
The simple model studied above to my knowledge is a first attempt to link
connection incentives, corruption and transparency in decision making. Its
extension to the case of N agents (potential decision makers) should generate
valuable insights and possibly new questions regarding transparency and the
control of corruption in organizations. Uncertainty about the identity of the
decision maker is introduced in the simplest way here, by assuming two po-
tential decision makers. In organizations decisions are made in committees or
in a hierarchical order. Committees consist of several decision makers, produ-
cing decisions in most cases according to the majority voting rule. The review
process for building permits in a Buildings Department is hierarchical, where
permits are accorded only if they are approved at all levels of the hierarchy.
The number of decision makers and the decision making rule will affect
connection incentives and corruption possibilities. For instance, incentives
to apply for an illegal construction permit will vanish if one has to “connect”
with a large number of decision makers to have the permit granted, given
the cost of establishing each connection and the level of transparency. Other
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factors being constant, it seems relatively difficult to influence a hierarchical
decision making process where authority and control is not too concentrated,
compared to a committee deciding through majority voting (it then suffices to
connect with and bribe the majority of committee members). But hierarchies
in which authority and control is concentrated at the hand of a top-level de-
cision maker should be relatively easy to penetrate, through a connection with
the top. The study of the interaction between connection-building incentives,
corruption, transparency and the decision-making rules and processes is an
interesting line of research.
A related issue is the emergence and functioning of an intermediate mar-
ket with specialized “suppliers of connections” who link decision makers
in public organizations to outsiders seeking illicit benefits. Our model has
ignored the possibility that clients connect to decision makers through inter-
mediaries. In especially developing countries the vicinity of public offices
such as customs departments are besieged by “industries” of intermediaries
who offer to process the paperwork for various services or applications (legal
or illegal) on behalf of the public. As in any market for intermediates, these
industries undertake the relevant connection investments that potential cli-
ents would otherwise have to undertake individually, thus supply connections
with the bureaucracy at a much lower cost. Intermediaries may also arise
within organizations. Some members of the organization may specialize in
connecting lower layers to upper layers where decisions are made, provide
information about key decision makers, carry the messages, transfer bribes
and gifts to realize corrupt benefits. Besides the potential impact on the costs
of establishing and maintaining connections, the emergence of a business of
intermediates would also depend on what happens to the likelihood of detec-
tions and the size of penalties compared to the case in which individuals try
to build their own connections as explored in the model above. These issues
await being addressed in a model that explicitly includes the possibility of
intermediates connecting clients to decision makers.
Notes
1. The relation between connections and corruption is well known: In an article on privat-
ization in China published in The New York Times (Dunn, May 8, 1993, p.3), a Chinese
businessman is cited to the effect that “if you have guanxi (the Chinese word for “con-
nections”), it is the time to make big money.” Of course, connections or trust can also
be used to the benefit of the society or organization. While not denying this possibility, I
focus exclusively on the potential abuses of connections. Organizations have institutional-
ized responses to potential abuses of established connections: In academics, departments
sometimes recruit their chairs from outside to avoid an appointment with strong internal
connections. Resistance to inbreeding has become a common practice of departments
partly because of the typically close connection between the graduate and the supervising
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faculty. Rotation policies that replace key decision makers in the organization also serve
to prevent connection building.
2. See for instance Klitgaard (1998), Gardiner and Lyman (1990) and the collection of essays
in Heidenheimer (1970).
3. Woodhouse (1997) offers a discussion of openness and transparency in the legal/public
administration context. For recent theoretical treatments of the problem of corruption
control in public hierarchies, see Bac (1996, 1998) and Bac and Bag (1999).
4. To keep the analysis simple I assume that the client cannot bribe agent r= B indirectly
through his connection with A. Using an indirect connection, if possible, is always more
risky and costly than a direct connection because the parties rely on the intermediates of
a third party (A if r= B). See the concluding section for a brief discussion of the use of
intermediaries for corruption.
5. That is, given the transparency levelα > 0, the signal j= A increases the probability
p(A, α) that agent A is the decision maker above 1/2. Then the probability that B is the
decision maker is less than 1/2.
6. The Nash bargaining solution divides the total surplus from corruption equally among the
two involved parties. The total surplus is UC(α) − 0− [0− Ur(α)] = z− µ(α)(FC +
Fr), and the threat points are both zero. Then, the Nash solution is b= µ(α)Fr + [z−
µ(α)(FC+Fr)]/2 whenever the total surplus is positive. Note that this surplus, if positive,
is increasing in z but decreasing inα, FC and Fr.
7. A numerical example can easily be constructed, for instance by choosingµ(α) = α2 and
p(., α) = (1+α)/2, and setting the values for the parameters z,FC,Fr andγ appropriately
to satisfy the assumptions z< FC + Fr andγ < z/2 ≤ 2γ . To give an example for the
“normal” case in which more transparency reduces the number of connections monoton-
ically from two to one and next from one to zero, letµ(α) = α, p(., α) = (1+ α)/2,
z= 10, FC+Fr = 20 andγ = 2. Then the number of connections is two forα ∈ [0,0.1),
one forα ∈ [0.1,0.153) and zero elsewhere.
8. The relative size of the potential corrupt benefit z and the connection costγ are also
important. Consider the potential benefit that a Soviet Army officer in 1980, stationed
in a good staff position in Leningrad, can obtain by avoiding being transferred to a unit
headed for Afghanistan. Corruption and connections (with assignment committees, ad-
missions committees or local housing committees) will not be affected by small-scale
improvements in transparency when the potential corrupt benefits are so high.
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